Enhancing Environmental Protection Tax Enforcement via Multi-Agent Game Theory in an Integrated E-commerce Online Supervision Platform: A Comprehensive Assessment

Abstract

Over the past five years since the enactment of the environmental protection tax, a measure has been implemented that has harmonized the conflicting interests among the government, E-businesses, and the E-market. A substantial body of game-theoretic analysis has focused exclusively on the interactions between government entities, producers (firms), and the general populace (consumers). This paper introduces an OSP (Online Supervision Platform) into the game framework, which assists government in sharing ecological environmental guardianship responsibilities, concurrently stimulating society and the E-market to explore environmental protection tax loopholes. It constructs a four-party evolutionary game model. The analysis assesses the stability of strategic choices for each participant in the game. Furthermore, a stability analysis of potential equilibrium points in the system is conducted based on the first law of Lyapunov stability. Simulation delves into the impact of key elements on the E-commerce’s evolution, scientifically examines the influence of OSP on stakeholders during the environmental protection tax implementation, providing a more comprehensive decision-making basis for environmental protection.