An RFID Authentication Protocol for EPC Class 1 Generation 2 Standard

Abstract

As RFID technology has emerged in our daily life, the prevention of illegal access and information leakage of RFID based applications becomes a practical requirement. A more secure and privacy aware RFID authentication protocol is devastatingly needed. Recently, Lin et al. proposed a mutual RFID authentication scheme conforming EPC Class 1 Generation 2 (EPC GEN 2) standard to deliver strong data privacy, robust system security and computation efficiency. However, their claimed security cannot hold. In this paper, we demonstrate how to break through Lin et al.'s authentication scheme by engaging a series of active attack procedures. The computational complexities of identified attacks are practical so that Lin et al.'s scheme cannot improve security any more than the EPC GEN 2 standard. Furthermore, we develop a new RFID authentication protocol to enhance security density, prevent threats of tag tracing and secrecy disclosure, and achieve the same computation order as Lin et al.'s protocol does.