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Formal Analysis on RFID Authentication Protocols Against De- Synchronization Attack

Kuo-Hui Yeh,
Nai-Wei Lo,
Ren-Zong Kuo,
Chunhua Su,
Hsuan-Yu Chen,

Abstract


Since RFID security, one of the most important issues, is the design of efficient authentication protocols with robust forward security. In this paper, we identify that a cluster of existing ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocols cannot defend against a de-synchronization attack, where an adversary is able to easily interrupt the transmission of necessary secret/key update messages in each authentication session such that the secret/key resynchronization between the tag and server/database cannot be completed. All of these vulnerable schemes are in the wrong development direction in terms of the design of their secret/key redundancy mechanisms. To conquer this problem, a secure transmission model for RFID authentication is proposed to deliver robust forward security, and to end the weakness-finding-and-fixing loop for ad-hoc RFID authentication protocols with the same vulnerable secret/key redundancy mechanisms.

Keywords


RFID; Security; Privacy; Authentication; Desynchronization attack

Citation Format:
Kuo-Hui Yeh, Nai-Wei Lo, Ren-Zong Kuo, Chunhua Su, Hsuan-Yu Chen, "Formal Analysis on RFID Authentication Protocols Against De- Synchronization Attack," Journal of Internet Technology, vol. 18, no. 4 , pp. 765-773, Jul. 2017.

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Published by Executive Committee, Taiwan Academic Network, Ministry of Education, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C
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